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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
age basis. Perhaps it is an unsubstantiated hunch, but it is the
writer's feeling that because of the economic cost involved in
making computations and because "marginal" gains and losses
through surface acreage computation are distributed evenly in
the long run when the larger companies operate all over the
state, landowners are the neglected parties in this situation.
A landowner may have only one producing mineral interest
in the state. What to him would be a highly significant amount
of money might in terms of the overall economic picture of his
lessee-operator be inconsequential. The writer has no present
statistical data which can reveal the truth or falsity of this
"hunch." However, it appears that the matter is deserving of
intensive study.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In the early case of Gay v. Blanchard,1 a question before
the court was whether the bringing of suit against a transferee
of property who had assumed payment of an indebtedness
secured by a mortgage covering the property interrupted the
running of prescription against the original debtor who was
the transferor. In support of this proposition it was argued
that, inasmuch as both the original debtor and the assumer were
bound for the payment of the debt, they were consequently
co-debtors in solido so that the institution of suit against one
interrupted prescription against the other. The court rejected
this contention and held that the mortgagor and the assumer
were not debtors in solido "in the sense of the Code." The opin-
ion recognized, however, that inasmuch as the parties were
bound for the same debt by their different acts at different
times, an imperfect solidarity existed in favor of the creditor.
The holding of the court was, therefore, that a suit against
one co-debtor of the same debt interrupts prescription against
the other only when the co-debtors are bound in solido "in the
sense of the Code," which seems clearly to mean, when by the
use of the term in solido or other equivalent expression they
"clearly show that they intend that each one shall be separately
bound to perform the whole of the obligation. '2 In such event,
the Gay opinion explained, the co-debtors are mandataries of
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2082 (1870).
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each other and a perfect solidarity exists.3 When this is not so
but nevertheless two or more co-debtors are bound for the same
debt, the resulting solidarity is imperfect. The holding in Gay
thus reflects the traditional difference between perfect solidarity,
or liability in solido, and imperfect solidarity, known by the
Romans as liability in solidum. Imperfect solidarity has been
described as solidary responsibility rather than solidary liability,
i.e., the creditor simply has the right to bring an action for the
entire performance against any of the persons liable and the
right to obtain judgment imposing solidary responsibility on
all of the solidary defendants. 4 In this latter case, the theory of
mutual representation has no applicability and there is no basis
for saying that the interruption of prescription as to one is
effective against the others.
Although the rule concerning the interruption of prescrip-
tion rests on the principle of mutual representation, this is not
true with respect to legal subrogation. Whether solidarity is
perfect or imperfect, a co-debtor who pays the debt, being
bound for or with another, or for the same debt as another,5
is entitled to legal subrogation. This was recognized in the Gay
case and is supported by convincing French authority.6
In the recent case of Murry v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins.
Co.,7 it was held that two liability insurers, each of whom was
bound in accordance with its policy with respect to the same
loss, were liable in solido, with the result that the appeal of the
insurer against whom judgment was rendered had the effect of
bringing before the appellate court the question of the solidary
liability to the plaintiff of the other insurer in whose favor
judgment had been rendered. Granting, without for the moment
considering the language of the two policies, that solidarity did
exist, it appears that it was an imperfect solidarity, or liability
in solidum rather than in solido. Nevertheless, since a defendant
whose liability is in solidum with that of another defendant may
be entitled to legal subrogation against the other, the holding
3. This is true also where solidary liability is imposed by the law, as,
for example, in the case of co-tortfeasors. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2324 (1870).
4. 4 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAw INSTITUTE 20-21 (1965). Note 6b of p. 21 indicates
that in France there has been some assimilation of the obligation in solidum
with perfect solidarity.
5. Cf. Howe v. Frazer, 2 Rob. 424 (La. 1842), and Forcum-James Co. v.
Duke Transportation Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So.2d 228 (1957).
6. MAZEAUD & MAZEAUD, LEgONS DE DROIT CIVIL no. 1072 (1962).
7. 198 So.2d 532 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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of the court with reference to the effect of the appeal seems
sound.
However, considering the language of the policies, it is
believed that the liability of the insurers in question was neither
in solido nor in solidum, but several. One policy provided cover-
age under the facts in the amount of $100,000.00, the other in the
amount of $5,000.00. Each contained a pro rata clause providing
in effect that the liability of the insurers would be propor-
tionate to the respective policy limits which, under the cir-
cumstances, would render one liable for 20/21 and the other
for 1/21. It thus appears that the insurers had, by the provi-
sions of their respective policies, each bound himself only for
his proportionate share of the loss.8 Judge Hood filed a dis-
senting opinion which took this view. The position of the major-
ity was that, subject to the limits of the respective policies,
each insurer was bound for the loss and that the pro rata
clauses were designed merely to regulate contribution between
the insurers.9
Judge Hood found support for his position in Fremin v.
Collins.10 In this case it was held that two uninsured motorist
insurers were bound severally rather than in solido and that
neither was entitled to claim contribution from the other. The
opinion in Fremin does not contain any mention of pro rata
clauses in the policies in question. It would not be in order,
therefore, to comment on the observation that each insurer would
be bound for the whole amount, payable on the facts, under its
own policy." In any event, the court refused to say that one
insurer could bring the other in as a party defendant on the
theory of solidarity, and this seems correct. Either each owed
$5,000.00, the limit in each policy, or one-half thereof, if the usual
other insurance clause was in each policy, but their liability
was neither in solido nor in solidum, and the payment by neither
would exonerate the other. Although a casual reading of the
opinion might support the conclusion that the court felt that
8. The holding of the same court in Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So.2d
390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), that two similarly situated insurers were liable
in solido is open to the same objection. The liability appears to have been
several, not solidary. The opinion contains a scholarly and enlightening dis-
cussion of the joint and several liability of the common law.
9. The legal theory on which one insurer can create in himself a right
of contribution against another through the use of a pro rata clause is not
clear.
10. 194 So.2d 470 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
11. Cf. LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967),
noted in 28 LA. L. Riv. 130 (1967).
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the filing of suit by an insured against an uninsured motorist
would interrupt prescription against the plaintiff's uninsured
motorist insurer, the opinion seems merely to hold that since
the insurer had agreed "to pay all sums which the insured
shall be legally entitled to recover" from the uninsured motorist,
it would follow that if judgment should be obtained by the
insured against the uninsured motorist, the insurer would then
be liable to the insured. In reaching this conclusion, the court
did say that the liability of the insurer to the insured was
ex delicto rather than ex contractu, but this seems to have been
not necessary to the decision. It does not appear that the insti-
tution of suit against an uninsured motorist should interrupt
prescription against the uninsured motorist carrier. Granting
that under the circumstances both may be bound for the same
debt, one delictually and the other contractually, the resulting
solidarity would be imperfect, not perfect, and neither would be
the representative of the other.
Since a person who is protected by the uninsured motorist
provisions in his own policy appears to have contracted with the
insurer for this protection, it seems entirely permissible to
say, contrary to the dictum in Fremin v. Collins, that his right
of action against his own insurer would be ex contractu rather
than ex delicto. This was the view taken in Booth v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co.12 From this point of view, it is of little conse-
quence that a suit against an uninsured motorist may not inter-
rupt prescription against the uninsured motorist carrier.
If because the ultimate responsibility of an insurer may
turn on whether there is other valid and collectible insurance,
it is desirable that the one should be able to make another a
defendant, it would be better to supply the deficiency by legis-
lation.
Other interesting decisions dealt with the problem of can-
cellation; 13 the liability of an insurer beyond policy limits
because of failure to keep the insured informed of offers of
settlement;14 the duty to defend;'5 the effect of settlements
12. 197 So.2d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967). An application for a writ of
review has been denied. Cf. Comment, 42 TUL. L. REv. 352 (1968).
13. F & H Catering Service, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 249
La. 667, 190 So.2d 91 (1966); Townzen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 474 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1966).
14. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 210 La. 105, 194
So.2d 713 (1967).
15. Benoit v. Fuselier, 195 So.2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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made by the insured with a wrongdoer;' the recovery of medical
expenses; 17 second permittees and the omnibus clause;18 and
intentional over-valuation of property.19 Limitations of space
preclude a discussion of the cited cases.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
Recognition of Sister-State Judgment
Under the constitutional requirement of "full faith and
credit," each state must recognize the judgments rendered in
sister states, provided that such judgments meet all the require-
ments of jurisdiction, especially in the case of a nonresident
defendant. These requirements for jurisdiction over nonresidents,
for the constitutional purposes of full faith and credit, are
necessarily established and interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. In moving away from the early requirement of
personal service of nonresident defendants,' and passing through
the formulas of doing business and constructive presence,2 the
constitutional requirement came to be satisfied by the nonresi-
dent's minimum contacts, which made the exercise of jurisdic-
tion a matter of fairness and justice in the circumstances. 8 To
take advantage of this range, most states enacted "long arm"
statutes to authorize and direct the action of their courts. The
question then is when does such a statute go too far.
In Moore v. Evans,4 the Louisiana court of appeal took it
upon itself to say that the Texas legislature had overreached
the constitutional limitations of due process insofar as it gave
Texas courts jurisdiction over a Louisiana defendant for a
promissory note signed in Louisiana but payable in Texas. There
16. Griffin v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 189 So.2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966); LaBove v. American Employers Ins., 189 So.2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
17. American Indemnity Co. v. New York F & M Underwriters, Inc., 196
So.2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
18. Comeaux v. Miller, 195 So.2d 168 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
19. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. St. Clair, 193 So.2d 821 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1967).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. by Scoles
1964) 112, 129, 136, 396; G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
66, 87-96 (3d ed. 1963).
3. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. 196 So.2d 839 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), writ refused, 250 La. 894, 199
So.2d 914 (1967).
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